The British Army invented the tank and pioneered its development during World War I, and produced the leading theorists of Armored warfare, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, during the interwar years.  Yet, the British were caught totally off-guard by the German blitzkriegs into Poland in 1939 and into France in 1940, and it took the British years to regain their superiority in armored warfare.

This book insightfully and authoritatively chronicles the development of the tank and the theory of armored warfare during this crucial era.  The greatest contribution of Professor Larson’s study is the refutation of the persistent and erroneous myths given to explain the failure of Great Britain’s armored forces at the beginning of the Second World War.  In the past, this failure has been attributed to the dominance of the officer corps by the “landed classes,” who had “entered the army seeking a leisurely outdoor style of life compatible with their upbringing.”  Because of their upbringing, this stereotype continues, these officers favored the cavalry, and staunchly opposed every effort aimed at the diminution in the use and influence of the cavalry.  These provincial traditionalists purportedly also sought to protect their revered regiments, many of which would have had to be abolished by the threatened expansion of the Royal Armored Corps.

The author adroitly presents statistical proof that this “social interpretation” is “very largely nonsense,” since in 1930 the aristocracy and landed gentry constituted only eleven percent of the entire officer corps and forty percent of those holding the rank of major-general or above (p. 17).  In addition, by an analysis of the promotion patterns of officers of the three combat arms (Infantry, cavalry, artillery) into the general officer ranks during the interwar period, the author shows that the cavalry was being steadily relegated to “a position of insignificance, if not total exclusion.” 

The author also ably dissects the argument that British government policy and draconian economic measures were the cause of the initial British armor setbacks in World War II, and concludes these pretexts have “severe limitations.”  This argument does not explain, after the government realized it must prepare for a Continental commitment, why the ratio of armor to Infantry decreased – when it should have logically been increased.  Nor does British policy explain the inability of its armored forces to successfully deploy against the Germans until the third year of the war.

From these analyses, the author keenly deduces that the British armored forces were improperly trained for the type of combat which confronted them in World War II, primarily because “the British Army refused to change its basic strategic doctrines to maximize the potential of a new weapon of war.”

The remainder of the book supports this thesis.  Pre-World War I military strategy was based upon the Napoleonic experience of “absolute war” and of the destruction of the opponent’s forces through unrelenting offensive pressure, the application of maximum force in the decisive attack, and “an unswerving determination by both commanders and troops to conquer at any cost.”  The victory of Britain and her Allies in the Great War – a war of attrition – vindicated in the minds of the generals their faith in this conception of war, confirming their dependence upon a psychological distortion of Clausewitz.  It was this dogmatic rigidity to the army’s traditional strategic doctrine, according to the author, which fettered innovations in British military thought during the interwar period.

This evolution, indeed revolution, of strategic doctrine is narrated in rich detail, correctly emphasizing the roles of Fuller and Liddell Hart and their coterie of kindred spirits.  This development is shown as manifested in the changing relationships between technology and strategic and tactical concepts and the increased emphasis on mechanization, changes in subsequent editions of the Field Service Regulations, and the topics of articles and editorials in the professional military journals.

The endnotes are very complete and readily serve as references to additional sources of information.  In juxtaposition with the endnotes, the bibliography shows that the author conducted extensive research on this topic.  He utilized War Office documents and memoranda, and the personal papers of such protagonists as Liddell Hart, Fuller, Hobart, and Lindsay, but apparently did not use the papers of other advocates of armored warfare, notably Stern and Swinton.  As the author included H. Rowan-Robinson’s Some Aspects of Mechanization (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1928) in his bibliography, it is unknown why Rowan-Robinson’s follow-up book, Further Aspects of Mechanization (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1929), was not included.

However, just as the early tanks were plagued with mechanical problems, this book is plagued with spelling, or typographical errors – at least six being noted in the first chapter alone.

The sole reference in this book, in an endnote, to A.P. Wavell as the author of an article on the strategy of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in World War I, is a glaring omission of Wavell’s actual accomplishments.  Wavell played a not insignificant role in the mechanization of the British Army.  In 1926 Wavell became G.S.O. 1 of the 3rd Division, where “the most significant part of Wavell’s work . . . was his close association with the birth and early trials of the first mechanized [sic] formation in the world, the Experimental Armoured [sic] Force of 1927-8, which was the mother of all armoured [sic] divisions.”  (John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), p. 155.)  In 1927, Wavell was among the team of contributors selected by Liddell Hart to write articles for the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. 

Wavell demonstrated his prescience and unorthodox thinking in the article “The Army and the Prophets,” (R.U.S.I. Journal, 75 (November 1930): 665-675).  Wavell addressed not only the potential of the “air arm” and gas weapons, but also addressed the transition to mechanized forces, “which do hold out some hopes of restoring to armies, freed from the dull obsession for mere numbers, full play for manoeuvre [sic] in the open field.” (p. 668).  In that same year Wavell was selected to command the 6th Infantry brigade of the 2nd Division, and in 1931 Wavell’s formation was entrusted with a series of experiments connected with the general mechanization of the Army, these experiments paralleling the earlier “Armoured [sic] force” experiments.  Wavell, aptly described by General Burnett-Stuart as “that inspired and inspiring teacher of troops,” also wrote Volume II of the Field Service Regulations (1935), a fact noted by Liddell Hart in his Memoirs (Volume I, p. 250), but totally ignored by Larson.  Wavell later successfully commanded the 2nd Division, and was Commander-in-Chief, Middle East (1939-1941), serving as O’Connor’s superior during the lauded Operation “Compass.”  Wavell’s accomplishments and his role in the mechanization of the British Army deserve at least a mention by the author.    

It is worth noting that Robert Allan Doughty’s The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1985), covering a similar theme in investigating the French Army’s lack of preparedness at the outbreak of World War II, serves as a singularly outstanding complement to Larson’s book.

Omissions and spelling errors aside, Larson’s book is a penetrating and discerning reappraisal of an important and controversial topic in British military history.  It is a model of clarity and percipient analysis, and convincingly demonstrates that the previously held notions on the failure of British armor during the lean years of World War II are erroneous.  This failure was due to the mental inflexibility of the British officer corps which did not permit them to advance their doctrine beyond the concepts of a war of attrition, in which armored forces would play a minor, subsidiary role.

This fascinating book is strongly recommended as essential reading for students of military history as well as for professional soldiers concerned with the innovative development of strategic and tactical doctrine.